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MALLOY tI. FONG

[So F. NOB. 18230, 18231. In Bank. June 1, 1951.]

CLINTON MALLOY, a Minor, etc., Appellant, V. WILLIAM
PETER FONG et a!., Respondents.
[1] Oharities-Liability of Oharitable Institutions. - Charitable
corporations are liable for their torts whether or not a particular plaintiff has paid for the charity received.
[2] Religious Societies-Actions-Evidence. - In an action in
which it is sought to charge a supervisory church body and
the individuals conducting a Bible school in a local church for
injuries suttered by plaintiff while attending the school, the
jury properly concluded that the agents who conducted the
school were the agents of the body, where an officer of the
body testified that it exercised control of churches in the
mission stage, where the pastor testified that the church was
in the mission stage, and where the embryonic character of the
church was further suggested by evidence that it was nt}'W and
only partially self-supporting, and that the body had the
power of selection and removal of the pastor who was responsible to and a member of the body.
[3] Id.-Liability.-The rule of f'e8pOnaeaf 8uperior applies to
ecclesiastical bodies.
[4] Independent Oontractors-Existence of Relationship-Right
of OontroL-Whether a person performing work for another
is an agent or an independent contractor depends primarily on
whether the one for whom the work is done has the legal right
to control the activities of the alleged agent.
[5] Id.-Existence of Relationship-Right to Terminate Services
as Factor.-The right of one engaging the services of another
immediately to terminate the services gives him a means of
control inconsistent with a principal and independent contractor relationship.

[1] Liability of privately conducted charity for personal injuriel!, notes, 14 A.L.R. 572; 133 A.L.R. 821. See, also, 5 Oal.Jm.

36; 10 Am.Jur. 691.
[4] See 16 Oal.Jm. 960; 35 Am.Jur. 445.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Charities, § 42; [2, 7, 8] Religious
Societies, § 18; [3] Religious Societies, § 12; [4, 6] Independent
Contractors, § 3; [5] Independent Contractors, § 5; [9] Automobiles, § 159; [10] Religious S~ieties, § 12 [11] Agency, § 3; [12]
Ar;ency, § 15; [13] Automobiles, § 243; [14] Religious Societies,
§ 12; [15] Religious Societies, § 3; (16] Appeal and Error, § 1209a;
[17-19] Automobiles, § 123(2); [20j Master and Servant, § 206;
[21] Automobiles, § 316; [22] Automobiles, § 362-1.
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[6] Id.-Existence of Relationship-Right of Control-It is not
essential that the right of control be exercised or that there be
actual supervision of the work of an agent. The existence of
the right of control and supervision establishes the existence
of an agency, as opposed to a principal and independent
contractor relationship.
[7] Religious Societies - Actions - Evidence. - Evidence that a
church supervisory body bad the right to install and remove
its ministers, to approve or disapprove their transfers to other
jurisdictions, and to supervise and control the activities of its
local churches, particularly those in the mission stage, supports
the conclusion that the body had a sufficient right to control
the activities of the pastor of a local embryonic church to
establish an agency relationship.
[8] Id. - Actions - Evidence. - A conclusion that such control
existed as to establish an agency relationship betwecn a supervil'Iing church body and a local church pastor is reinforced by
evidence that the pastor was engaged solely in his work with
the church; that his work was subject to supervision by the
supervising church body; that none of the duties performed
by him were too complicated for efficient supervision by such
church body; that the principal instrumentalities of his work
were the property of the employer; that his employment was
on an indefinite basis; that he was paid by the month; that all
the activities of the church revolved around his office; and that
at the time of employment neither he nor the supervising body
gave any thought to the distinction between agent and
independent contractor.
[9] Automobiles-Persons Liable for Injuries.-In an action for
personal injuries suflered in an automobile accident while
plaintift' was being transported with others from a church to
ncreational grounds as a part of a Bible school program, a
finding of negligence on the part of the pastor in charge of the
program is supported by eviden('!e that he permitted and participated in a race between his automobile and that on which
plaintift' was riding, forcing the other driver to enter an intersection on the wrong side of the street; thus causing the accident; or that he permitted plaintift' and others to ride on the
running boards of the vehicles causing plaintift"s injury.
[10] ReligiOUS Societies-Liabilit)'.-A church supervisory body
is liable for injuries caused by the tort of its agent, a church
pastor, acting within the scope of his agency.
[11] AgenC)'-Existence-Creation.-An agency relationship may
be informally created, neither particular words nor consideration being required, but simply conduct by each party mani-

[11] See 1 CaJ.Jur. 694, 696; 2 Am.Jur. 23.
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festing ac('eptance of a relationship whereby one of them is to
perform work for the other under the latter's direction.
[12] Id.-Existence-Evidence.-A finding of an agency relationship between a church pastor and another is supported by evidence that the other gratuitously assumed the pastor's responsibility for the supervision and control of instruction and
activities connected with a church Bible school during the
illness of the pastor, that such participation was essential to
the conduct of the school, and that he continued to perform
duties in connection therewith under the supervision of the
pastor after the latter's reassumption of authority.
[13] Automobiles-Evidence-AgenCJ.-In an action for personal
injuries suffered while plaintiff was being transported with
others from a church to recreational grounds as a part of a
Bible school program under the supervision of the church
pastor as agent for a church supervisory body, evidence that
the driver of the automobile on which plaintiff was riding
performed duties for which the pastor was responsible, that
his performance of those duties was subject to th..-pastor's
supervision and control, and that the services could be terminated by the pastor at any time, supports a conclusion that ~
the driver was a subagent acting within the scope of his
agency at the time of the accident.
[14] Religious Societies-Liability.-Where the pastor of a church, acting within the scope of his authority, as agent of a church
supervisory body, in organizing and staffing a church Bible
school program, appoints a subagent, the body is liable for the
negligence of the subagent acting within the scope of his
agency. (Civ. Code, §§ 2349, 2351.)
[16] Id.-Organization-Incorporation.-In an action in which it
is sought to charge a church supervisory body for the negligence of a pastor of a church and another as the body's agents
in conducting a church Bible school, it cannot be successfully
urged that the corporation which has been made a defendant
in the action was organized solely to hold property and is not
the same as the religious entity which supervises the denomination's churches and ministers, where the language of the
preamble and purpose clauses of the articles of incorporation
is broad enough to include supervision of religious activities
and is simply 11 statement of the purposes of the supervisury
body before as well as after incorporation.
[16] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for !few TriaLWhere an order granting a new trial does not specify the
ground on which it is made, it will be assumed on I1ppeal that
the order is not based on insufficiency of the .evidence to
support the verdict.
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[17] Automobiles-Care as to Gnests-Who are Guests.-In determining whether Ii boy injured in an automobile driven by a
divinity student to a playground during the recreation period
. of a church Bible school was a guest or paid compensation
for the ride, it is immaterial that the dIvinity student drove the
car gratuitously; it is sufTIcient if the miuister of the church
or the church or ecclesiastical body itself received a benefit
from the boy's transportation to the playground.
[18] ld.-Care as to Guests-Who Are Guests.-Evidence that
transportation of children attending a church Bible school to a
playground for the recreation period was an integral part of
the school's program, that it was to the mutual benefit of the
children and the church that the children attend the school,
that the minister had a large number of handbills printed
urging attendance at the school, and that the children had
recently been released from secular schools for their summer
vacation, supports an inference that the daily open-air recreation periods were designed to and did induce parents to send
their children to the school, and such inference negatives the
theory that no compensation was given for the transportation
during such recreation periods.
[19] ld.-Care as to Guests-Who Are Guests.-Evidence that a
boy attended a church Bible school financed in part by parents'
contributions to the church and by their payments to defray
expenses I incidental to the running of the school supports an
inference that compensation was given for the boy's ride to a
playground for physical recreation within the meaning of
Veh. Code, § 403.
[20] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Relation of
Parties.-The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable
to the relationship between a supervisor and his subordinate
employees.
[21] Automobiles-Instructions-Agent or Servant.-In an action
for personal injuries sustained by a boy while in an automobile
being driven by a divinity student to a playground during the
recreation period of a church Bible school, it is error to
instruct the jury that they might find the minister of the
church liable for the divinity student's negligence on the
theory that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to the
relationship between these two.
[22] ld.-New Trial.-Where there is a substantial confbct in the
evidence as to whether the minister of the church conducting
a summer Bible school was himself negligent and liable for an
accident to a boy while he was being transported by automobile to a playground during a recreation period of the
school, and it cannot be determined whether the jury based
its verdict against the minister on that ground or on an erro-
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DI.'OnS instruction that he could be found liable for the negligenc!' of 8 divinity student driving the automobile in which
thc boy was riding, it is proper to grant the minister's motion
for a new trial.

APPEALS from part of a judgment of the Superior Court
of the City and County of Sall Francisco and from an order
granting a new trial. Sylvain J. Lazarus, Judge. Part of
judgment appealed from, reversed with directions; order
affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a
collision of vehicles. Part of judgment denying a recovery
against one defendant, reversed with directions.
M. Mitchell Bourquin, Healy & Walcom, Jacobs, Blanckenburg & May and John J. Healy for Appellant.
Clarence A. Linn, Robert W. MacDonald, Dan H!}dsell,
Roscoe D. Jones, Raymond L. Hanson, Cooley, Crowley &
Gaither and Louis V. Crowley for Respondents.
Raymond L. Hanson and Albert C. Agnew as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Respondents.
TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff brought this action for damages
for personal injuries allegedly caused by the concurrent negligence of defendants Holmes, Fong, and Antisdale. Plaintiff alleged that Fong and Antisdale were acting as agents
of defendant Presbytery of San Francisco. The jury exonerated defendant Holmes, but returned a verdict in favor of
plaintiff in the amount of $41,500 against defendants Fong,
Antisdale, and the Presbytery of San Francisco. On motion
of defendant Presbytery, the trial court entered a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict as to it. Defendant Antisdale's
motion for new trial was granted. Defendant Fong's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. Plaintiff appeals from the order granting a new trial as to defendant Antisdale and from that part of the judgment that denies
recovery against the Presbytery. Defendant Fong has not
appealed.
During the summer vacation of 1943, plaintiff, then a boy of
13, attended a vacation Bible school conducted at the San
Mateo Presbyterian Church for thp children of members of
the church, then a "mission" under the jurisdiction of de-
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fClldant Presbytery of San Francisco. Defendant Antisdalc,
pastor of the church, was in charge of the school and gave the
Bible instruction. The Bible classes were supplemented by
classes in arts and crafts and by supervised recreation at a
nearby playground to wbich the children were taken in automobiles and from whicb they were returned to the church
at the conclusion of the recreation period.
Antisdale became ill several days before July 1, 1943, the
day plaintiff was injured, and was unable to conduct the
school. It was therefore left without effective supervision and
without an instructor qualified to conduct the Bible classes.
Defendant Fong, a 19-year-old divinity student, was at that
time vacationing at the home of his guardian, Dr. Jones. a
retired Presbyterian minister, in San Mateo. Fong agreed to
conduct the Bible instruction in Antisdale's absence so that
Antisdale might stay home and rest. In addition to conducting
the Bible classes, Fong drove the children to the playground
for their recreation period in his guardian's automobile, a
Ford station wagon lent to him for that purpose.
Antisdale returned to the church on the day of the accident,
but he was occupied in his office the greater part of the morning, and Fo~ remained in charge of the dass. At the conclusion of the Bible instruction, Fong released the children
to wait outside the church for transportation to the playground for the recreation period. Antisdale emerged from
his office to see the children climbing into Fong's station wagon
and several boys, including plaintiff, standing on the running
boards. Antisdale then informed the children that he would
take some of them in his car to relieve the congestion in the
station wagon, and several of them entered the back seat of
his car. Two of the boys left Fong's station wagon and stood
on the running boards of Antisdale's car. The other children
remained in Fong's station wagon, plaintiff standing on the
left running board and another boy standing on the right
running board. Antisdale testified that he ordered the children off the running boards. It is undisputed, however, that
Antisdale did not insist on compliance with his order and that
the children continued to stand on the running boards of his
car and Fong's.
The church was located on Twenty-fifth Avenue in San
Mateo, a street running east and west; the playground to
which the children were being taken was located on Twentyeighth Avenue, severa] blocks wcst of the church. Twentyeighth A venue is intersected east of the playground by Isabelle
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A venUl', a street running north and south. The two vehicles
IE.'ft for the playground, driving west on Twenty-fifth Avenue,
Antisdale's car in the lead, closely followed by Fong's station
wagon. They then turned south to Twenty-eighth Avenue and
again beaded west toward the playground. During the trip
the children in each vehicle werE.' shouting and challenging
the children in the other vehicle to a race to the playground.
Although the evidence is conflicting on this point, there is
testimony that Fong and Antisdale entered into the spirit
of the competition and increased the speed of their vehicles.
After the vehicles turned west on Twenty-eighth Avenue, Fong
pulled out to the left and endeavored to pass Antisdale, who
increased the speed of his car to prevent Fong from passing.
Fong pulled up parallel to Antisdale but was unable to pass
him because Antisdale had increased his speed. Twentyeighth Avenue has only one lane for vehicular traffic proceeding in each direction, so that Fong's station wagon during the
time he W8.'l attempting to pass Antisdale was being"driven
well over in the left-hand lane, almost to the opposite curb.
The two vehicles approached the intersection of Twenty-eighth
and Isabelle Avenues in that position, Fong still unsuccessfully attempting to pass Antisdale. Antisdale stopped his car
at the hitersection, but Fong proceeded out into the intersection at an excessive rate of speed, still on the left-hand side
of the road. Defendant Holmes was driving her car north
on Isabelle Avenue and had just pulled out into the intersection when Fong drove by her. The vehicles were too close
for her to stop in time and, according to her testimony, Fong
made no effort to stop. Her right front fender and Fong's
station wagon collided, striking plaintiff standing on the left
running board. As a result of the collision, plaintiff lost his
left leg below the knee and sustained injuries of a permanently disabling nature to his ri~ht.leg, necessitating prolonged
hospitalization and medical treatment.
Plaintiff's complaint was in three counts. In the first count
he alleged that Fong was the agent of Antisdale and the Presbytery, that he was a passenger in Fong's car at the time of
the accidE.'nt, and that the accident was caused by the concurrent nplZ1i~E'n('e of defendants Fong and Holmes. In the second count he alleged that Antisdale was the agent of the
PrC'sbytery, and that his negligence was a cause of the injuriC's to plaintiff in that he "negligently and carelessly in(,l'E'as!'u th(' speE.'d of his said Chevrolpt sedan automobile, 80
8S to render it impossible for said Ford Station W &gOn [driven
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by Fong], in which plaintiff was riding, to pasR and return
to th(' right side of the roadway, so that the two (2) vehicles
ran abreast into the inters('etion of s:lid 28th Avenue with Isabelle Avenue, proximately causing and precipitating a collision between said Ford Station Wagon in which plaintiff was
riding and that Raid Chevrolet sedan automobilc being driven
by defendant EI('anor Holmes." In the third count, plaintiff
alleged that AntiRdale and Fong were negligent in failing to
exercise proper care for the safety of the children for whom
they were responsible in that t.hey negligently permitted several of them, including plaintiff, to ride on the mnning boards
of the two vehicles, and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Defendants Antisdale, Fong, and Holmes answered, denying
negligence and pleading that plaintiff was contributively negligent. Defendant Presbytery denied that Fong was the agent
of Antisdale, or that either of them was its agent, or that
plaintiff was a passenger in Fong's station wagon. It pleaded
three defenses: (1) that plaintiff was contributively negligent; (2) that the sole cause of the accident wa."! the negligence
of defendant Holmes; and (3) that it is a charitable corporation, engaged solely in the propagation of religion and "does
not contemplate the distribution of gainR, profits or dividends
to its members, and that at no time has it engaged in any activity other than the propagation of religion. That this defendant has at all times exercised due and reasonable care in
the selection of its servants and agents."
Plaintiff contends that there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury, that there were neither errors
of law nor irregularity in the proceedinJ!S at the trial, and
that the trial court improperly granted defendants' motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.
In support of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the
Presbytery contends that, as a charitable corporation, it il!l
not liable to nonpaying beneficiaries for the torts of its agents,
and that, as a matter of law, neither Fong nor Antisdale were
its agents at the time of the accident. In support of the order granting a new trial, Antisdale contends that the trial
court committed error in the giving of two instructions: one,
that the jury could find against Antisdale if fhey fonnd that
Fong was biR agent and was negligent; the other, that a verdict might be returned against. Fonl! and al!ainst Antisdale
as his principal, even though the jury found Fong guilty only
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of ordinary or gross negligence, if it also found that plaintiff
was a passenger and not a guest in Fong's station wagon .
.Antisdale contends that, as a matter of law, Fong was not his
agent and plaintiff was a guest in Fong's station wagon, and
that the instructions were therefore prejudicially erroneous
in that they submitted to the jury as a question of fact a
matter that was one of law and •• at the least permitted the
jury to find sucb a relation" when in fact none existed.
(Edward.~ v. Freeman, 34 Ca1.2d 589, 594 [212 P.2d 883].)
Plaintiff's Appeal from the Judgment for the
Presbytery of San Francisco
The Presbytery contends that, as a charitable corpora·
tion, it is exempted from liability to nonpaying beneficiaries
by the holding of this court in Thomas v. German General
Benevolent Society, ]68 Cal. 183, 188 [141 P. 1186], that
"where one accepts the benefit of a public or a private charity
he exempts by implied contract the benefactor from IYtbility
for the negligence of the servants in administering the char·
ity, if the benefactor has used due care in the selection of
those servants." (Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Assn.,
206 Cal. 115, 116 [273 P. 580] ; Bardinelli v. Church of All
Nations,23 Cal.App.2d 713, 714-715 [73 P.2d 1264); Young
v. Boy Scouts of America, 9 Cal.App.2d 760, 764 [51 P.2d
1911; Ritchie v. Long Beach Com. Hospital Assn., 139 Cal.
App. 688, 690 [34 P.2d 771) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital,
116 Cal.App. 375, 379 [2 P.2d 520] ; Hallinan v. Prindle, 17
Cal.App.2d 656, 669 [62 P.2d 1075] ; Shane v. Hospital of the
Good Samaritan, 2 Cal.App.2d 334, 335-340 [37 P.2d 1066];
ct. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Salvation Army, 83 Cal.App.
455,456,461·462 [256 P. 1106].)
The theory of the Thomas case, however, was abandoned by
this court in St1va v. Providence Hospital, 14 Ca1.2d 762, 775
[97 P.2d 798), and England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 14 Ca1.2d 791 [97 P.2d 813], for the reason that "the im·
plied contract doctrine has been used to rationalize a result
and is not based upon the intention of the parties, as legal
principle requires." Those cases held that a charitable hospi·
tal was liable to a paying patient for injuries resulting from
the neg-ligence of a nurse.
The Presbytery contends that the Silva and England cases
are limited to the facts presented therein and do not require
the complete abandonment of the doctrine of charitable im·
munity. It contends that, since the plaintiffs in those cases

II
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were paying patients of the defendant hospitals, thC' decisions
therein state a rule applicable only to paying beneficiaries of
the acth'ities of ebaritable corporations. It is contended that
as to nonpaying recipients. of charity the rule of the Thomas
case is still applicable.
It is true, as the Presbytery asserts, that the plaintiffs
in the Silva and England cases paid for the services they
received. It does not follow, however, that the reasoning applied in those cases is limited to paying beneficiaries. The
theories advanced by the earlier decisions or urged by the
Presbytery in support of the partial retention of the doctrine
of charitable immunity are as applicable to paying beneficiaries as to those who do not pay. If the theories discussed
and discarded by this court in the Silva and England cases
do not justify immunity from liability in the case of a paying
beneficiary, there is no logical justification for clinging to
them in the case of the beneficiary who does not pay. (Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 397,
398 [175 N.W. 699] ; Sheehan v. North Country Com. Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 166 [7 N.E.2d 28, 109 A.L.R. 1197] ; Dillon
v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N.Y. 176, 180 [30 N.E.2d
.373] ; Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Assn., 73 N.H. 556,
564 [64 A.1190, 7 L.R.A.N.S. 496] ; Foster v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Vermont, - - Vt. - - [70 A.2d 230, 234-235] ;
see 28 Cal.L.Rev. 530, 533.)
"Abolition of the immunity as to the paying patient is
justified as the last short step but one to extinction. Retention for the nonpaying patient is the least defensible and
most unfortunate of the distinction's refinements. He, least
of all, is able to bear the burden. More than all others, he
has no choice. He is the last person the donor would wish to
go without indemnity. With everyone else protected, the
additional burden of protecting him cannot break the trust.
He should be the first to have reparation, not last and least
among those who receive it. So stripped of foundation, the
distinction falls. I t should fall in line with, not away from,
the trend which has brought it about. The immunity should
go and the object of the charity should be placed on a par
with all others." (Rutledge, J., in President &- Directors of
Georgetown College \". Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827.)
The Presbytery asserts that this court adopted a distinction based on payment in Humphreys v. San Francisco
Area Council, 22 Ca1.2d 436 [139 P.2d 941]. It misconstrues
that decision. A judgment for defendant was there affirmed
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on the ground, not that it was a charity and therefore immune,
but that the plaintiff had given no compensation for the ride
he received in the vehicle in which he was injured and was,
therefore. under Vehicle Code seetion 403, a guest not entitled to recover in the absence of wilful misconduct or intoxication on the part of the driver. This court did not pass upon
the extent of defendant's liability as a charitable corporation
for the reason that under section 403 no actionable wrong had
been committed. (22 Ca1.2d 436, 443-444; see, also, Edwards
v. HoUt/wood Canteen, 27 Cal.2d 802, 812 [167 P.2d 729}.)
'rhe Presbytery contends that public policy requires the
preservation of its immunity from liability for torts committed by its agents 011 nonpaying beneficiaries of its charity.
The declared publie policy of this state, however, is contrary
to that yiew: "Rveryone is responsible, not only for the
result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to
another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management
of his property or pl'rson. . .. " (Civ. Code, § 1714.) T~at
policy admits of no exception based upon the objectives.
however laudable. of the tort feasor. (See, also, Mulliner v.
Evannelischer Dial:onlllessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 398 [175
N.W. 699].) As was said in the Silva case, supra: ., [N]o
one is obliged by law to assist a stranger, even though he can
do so by a mere word, and without the slightest danger to
himself. However, once he has undertaken to render assistance the law imposes upon him a duty of care toward the
pf'rson assisted.
(Restatement of Law of Torts, § 324;
McLeod v. Rawsun, 215Mass. 257 [102 N.E. 429, 46 L.R.A.N.S.
;)47] ; Hoyt v. Tilton, 81 N.H. 477 [128 A. 688) . . . . Professor Harper, in his book, 'The Law of Torts,' points out that
'the lmmunity of charitable corporations in tort is based upon
very dubious rerounds.' Continuing, he concludes: 'It would
seem that a sound social policy ought, in fact, to require such
organizations to make just compensation for harm legally
caused b;v tlJeir activities nnder the same circumstances as
individual.. before they carry on their charitable activities.
The> policy of the law requiring individuals to be just before
gpncrous seems equally applicable to charitable corporations.
To require an injured !ndividual to forego compensation for
harm Whe'll he is otherwise entitled thereto, because the injury
was committed by the servants of a charity, is to require him
to make an nnreasonablr contribution to the charity, again!!t
his will, anu u rnle of law imposing' sllch burdens can not be
regarded as socially desirabJe nor consistent with sound
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policy.' (Sec. 294.)" (Silva v. Prov~dence Hospital, 14 Cal.2d
762,775 [97 P.2d 798].) "The incorporated charity should
respond as do private individuals, business corporations and
others, when it does good in the wrong way." (President &;
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra, 130 F.2d
810,828.) The dictum in Thomas v. German General Benevolent Society, 168 CaL 183, 188 [141 P.1186]. and the decisions
following it are disapproved.
[1] It has been suggested that plaintiff in effect paid for
the services rendered by the Daily Vacation Bible School,
inasmuch as his parents made contributions for the support
of the school. These contributions, however, were voluntary
and anonymous and unlike the scheduled charges for medical
and hospital care that were paid by the plaintiffs in the Silva
and England cases. It is not certain, therefore, that plaintiff
could qualify as a "paying beneficiary" of the charity in this
case. In any event, a consideration of this question is not
necessary in view of our decision that charitable corporations
are liable for their torts whether or not a particular plaintiff
has paid for the charity received.
The Presbytery next contends that Antisdale and Fong
were not agents of the Presbytery.
[2] The evipence introduced at the trial shows that the
Presbyterian denomination in this country is an integrated
ecclesiastical organization. There are four principal levels of
authority: the General Assembly, the Synods, the Presbyteries, and the local churches or "Sessions." As the name
•• Presbyterian" suggests, the Presbytery is a vital unit of
this organization, and it has extensive powers of control over
the churches within its jurisdiction. In practice, such power
is seldom exercised over firmly established, thriving congregations, but there are at least three situations where this
authority is of great importance: (1) before a local church
is fully established, missionary activities are conducted by the
Presbytery; (2) when a church becomes too large, the Presbytery supervises its division into smaller churches and has
the power to apportion property among them (see Wheelock v.
First Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles, 119 Cal. 477, 482
[51 P. 841]) ; (3) in a declining neighborhood, when a church
is no longer able to function successfully by itself, the Presbytery takes over (see Tabor Presbyterian Church Dissolution
Case, 347 Pa. 263 [32 A.2d 196]).
Plaintiff contends that at the time of the accident the
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San Mateo Presbyterian Church was in the "mission" stage,
that the Presbytery was therefore directly engaged in promoting Presbyterianism in that area, and that the Daily
Vacation Bible School was an integral part of this activity by
the Presbytery. Early in the trial this issue was emphasized
by comments of the trial court to the jury; the jurors were
expressly told to look for the degree to which the Presbytery
conducted the social and recreational activities of the San
Mateo Church. "In other words, if those matters were left
to the local church to be solved and were controlled by the
local organization, then the Presbytery wouldn't be involved."
The verdict against the Presbytery necessarily involves a
finding by the jury that these matters were not left to the
local church. This finding is sufficiently supported by evidence that the San Mateo Church was in an embryonic stage
at the time of the accident and that, in view of that fact, its
activities were conducted by the Presbytery.
The missionary character of the local church is suggested
by the fact that its property was held by the Presbytery. The
Presbytery held the lease for the building where the services
and Bible classes were conducted. The rental on this building
was nominally paid by the church, but for most of this amount
it received a monthly subsidy from the War Emergency Fund
of the national Presbyterian organization. Not until after
the incorporation of the church in 1945, almost two years after
the accident, did the Presbytery convey to the church other
land on which the present edifice is located. The San Mateo
church did not pay all of Antisdale's salary; it received a
monthly subsidy for this purpose from the National Board of
Missions.
Antisdale himself testified that the church was in an
embryonic st.age and was considered a mission church. Later,
following a recess at the trial, he testified t.hat he did not
know what the technical definition of a mission church is,
that" I believe it must be one that is solely supported by the
National Mission Board, and I do not think it could quite
qualify as that." Whet.her or not. the church was a mission in a t.echnical ecclesiastical sense, the fact that it was
considered a mission church attest.s strongly to its embryonic '
character and indicat.es that t.here was a close working
relationship bet.ween the church and the Presbytery.
The Presbytery had the power to approve or disapprove
Antisdale's selection as minic:;ter. Following his installation
in that office by the Presbytery, he was not responsible
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to the local church but only to the Presbytery. The Presbytcry, not the church, had the power to remove him. Furthermore, he could not transfer to another pastorate without th€
permission of the Presbytery, and in fact be was a membcr of
the Presbytery rather than of the local church.
As the judicatory in charge ")f all Presbyterian churches
in the San Francisco Bay area, the Presbytery of San
Francisco had primary responsibility for the extension
of the Presbyterian movement into new localities in that
region. It was the Presbytery that organized the San Mateo
group in 1942 and undertook the task of transforming it into
a full-fledged church. During this early period, the Presbytery not only held the church property but was in charge
of church activities. Speaking of churches in the mission
stage, an officer of the defendant Presbytery testified: "that
really is the place where the presbytery does exercise control. "
The establishment and maintenance of religious education for
children was an important part of the Presbytery's project
in San Mateo. The jury could properly conclude, therefore,
that the agents who conducted the Daily Vacation Bible School
were the agents of the Presbytery.
It bears emphasis that we are not here called upon to deter.
mine the liability of the Presbytery for negligence in the
activities of a fully' established and independently incorporated Presbyterian church which has passed the mission stage.
The Presbytery has cited a number of decisions in other
states to the effect that bishops and similar ecclesiastical
bodies are not liable for the torts of local ministers. ~one of
these cases involved supervision of a mission church. Furthermore, some were contract actions and turned upon specific
findings that the act of the subordinate was beyond his contractual authority(Leahey v. Williams, 141 Mass. 345, 355357 [6 N.E. 78] ; Davidsville First National Bank v. St. John's
Church, 296 Pa. 467, 472 [146 A. 102]), or that an alleged
agency by estoppel had not been proved (Reifsnyder v.
Dougherty, 301 Pa. 328, 333-334 [152 A. 98]). In Carini v.
Beaven, 219 Mass. 117 [106 N.E. 589, L.R.A. 1915B 825],
the plaintiff did not rely upon the doctrine of respondeat
superior but alleged the violation of a duty owed directly by
the defendant bishop; the case turned solely on principles of
negligence and proximate cause. In Magnuson v. O'Dea, 75
Wash. 574 [135 P. 640, Ann.Cas. 1915B 1230, 48 L.R.A.N.S.
327], the appeal did not concern the bishop as a bishop, but
WI an individual, and involved allegations that he had himself
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participated in the tortious conduct. The action of the trial
court in dismissing the suit as to the bishop in his corporate
capacity was not discussed on appeal, but it is siJnifiennt that
under local decisions the doctrine of charitJ\ble immunity was
applicable. (Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coa.l Co., 10 Wash.
648, 655 [39 P. 95] ; Tn"bble v. Missionary Sisters of Sacred
Heart, 137 Wash. 326, 329-330 [242 P. 372].) [8] Oncc
the claim of charitable immunity is rejected, there is no compelling reason for not applying the rule of rcspondeat superior
to ecclesiastical bodies as it applies to other employers.
The Presbytery contends that even if Antisdale was engaged in work for the Presbytery, he was an independent
contractor for whose negligence the Presbytery was not
responsible.
[4] Whether a person performing work for another is '
an agent or an independent contractor depends primarily
upon whether thl:! one for whom the work is done has the
legal right to control the activities of the alleged agent. ./
(Edward.s v. Freeman, 34 Cal.2d 589, 592,593 [212 P.2d 883] ;
Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., 28 Cal.2d
33,43 [168 P.2d 686].) [5] The power of the principal to
terminate the services of the agent gives him the menns of
controlling the agent's activities. "The right to immediately
discharge involves the right of control." (Riskin v. 1ndustrial Acc. Com., 23 Cal.2d 248, 253, 255 [144 P.2d 16];
Ry"n v. Farrell, 208 Cal. 200, 202-203 [280 P. 945] ; Western
Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 417 [156 P. 491,
Ann.Cas. 1917E 390] ; Chapman v. Edwards, 133 Cal..App. 72,
77,79 [24 P.2d 211] ; Y1tcaipa Ihr.rmers Cooperative Assn. v.
Industrial Acc. Com., 55 Cal.App.2d 234, 237 [130 P.2d
146].) [6] It is not essential that the right of control be
exercised or that there be actual supervision of the work of
the agent. The existence of the right of control and supervision establishes the existence of an agency relationship.
(Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., 28 Cal.2d
33, 43 [168 P.2d 686].) [7] The evidence clearly supports
the c.onclusion of the jury that such control existed in thE'
present case. The right of the Presbytery to install and
remove its ministers, to approve or disapprove their transfer
to other jurisdictions, and to supervise and control the activities of the local churches, particularly those in the mission
sta/!"e, is inconsistent with a contrary conclusion.
[8] Other tests are sometimes invoked, in addition to the
power of control, in determining whether one is an agent.

jl

I

June 1951]

MALLOY V. FONG
(37 C.2d 356; 231 P.2d 2411

371

They reinforce thc conclusion that Antisdale was an agent
and not an iudependent contractor. As listed in Empire
Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra, (ct. Rest.,
Agency § 220) they include: "(a) [W]hether or not the one
performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business. " Antisdalc was not engaged in an independent
occupation in the sense that he contracted with different
churches to perform various pastoral services on a job basis;
the evidence shows that he was engaged solely in his work with
thc San Mateo church and that he could accept no other
assignments as a Presbyterian minister without the consent of
the Presbytery. "(b) [T)he kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under
the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision. " In the locality in question, as well as elsewhere, the
work of a pastor of a Presbyterian church is subject to
the same supervision by the Presbytery as outlined above.
"(c) [T]he skill required in the particular occupation."
The element of skill is closely linked to the policy considerations that render one free from liability for the acts of
an independent contractor. A property owner, for example,
may be unable to understand the intricacies of erecting a
building upon his Ilaud-the most that he can ordinarily be
expected to do is to usc care in the selection of a construction contractor. The Presbytery contends that the services
here involved were "professional," like those rendered by a
physician or au attorney, and that as a matter of law a minister should be regarded as an independent contractor. The
skills possessed by Antisrlale were also possessed by the Presbytery; it was the Presbytery in fact that determined that he
was qualified for this position, whereas medical, legal, or construction experts are examined and licensed by state authority.
None of the duties performed by Antisdale were too complicated for efficient supervision by the Presbytery. "(d)
[W]hether the principal or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and theplnce of work for the person doing
the work." Although the vehicles used at the time of the
accidcnt were supplied by Antisdale and Fong, the principal instrumentalities of Antisdale's work were the property of the employer; for l'xample, the property on which the
church services and the classes of the Daily Vacation Bible
School were held was leased for the church by the Presbytery.
"(e) [T]he length of time for which the services are to be
performed. " Antisdale was officially ordained and installed
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by the Presbytery in 1943; he transferred to the South Hollywood Church in 1945. So far as anything in the evidence
suggests, his employment in San Mateo was on an indefinite
basis. "(f) [T]he method of payment, whether by the time
or by the job." Antisdale was paid by the month. "(g)
[W]hether or not the work is a part of the regular business
of the principal." All the activities of the church, including
the Daily Vacation Bible School, revolved around the office of
the pastor. "(h) [W]hether or not the parties believe they
are creating the relationship of employer-employee." There
is no evidence that at the time Antisdale was employed either
he or the Presbytery gave any thought to the distinction
between agent and independent contractor.
[9] Although the evidence as to Antisdale's negligence is
conflicting, there is substantial evidence to support the finding
that he was negligent and that his negligence was a cause of
the injury to plaintiff. Such a finding is supported on either
of two grounds: (1) that Antisdale negligently permitteti
and participated in a race between his automobile and the
station wagon driven by Fong, causing both vehicles to travel
at an excessive speed, and forcing Fong to enter the intersection of Twenty-eighth and Isabelle Avenues on the wrong
side of the roadway, thus causing the accident; and (2 ) that
Antisdale was negligent in permitting plaintiff among others
to ride on the running boards of the vehicles, and that such
negligence caused the injuries of which plaintiff complains.
[10] It is clear that Antisdale was acting in the scope of his
agency at the time the tort was committed. As his principal,
the Presbytery is liable for injuries to plaintiff resulting
therefrom.
The verdict against the Presbytery may be supported
not only on Antisdale's negligence but on that of Fong as
well. Civil Code section 2351 provides: "A subagent, lawfully appointed, represents the principal in like manner with
the original agent. . .. " Antisdale was an agent of the
Presbytery, i.e., the "original" agent, and he lawfully
appointed Fong a subagent.
[11] An agency relationship may be informally created.
No particular words are necessary, nor need there be consideration. All that is required is conduct by each party manifesting acceptance of a relationship whereby one of them is to
perform work for the other under the latter's dircction. (See
1 Ca1.Jur., Agency, 694, 696, §§ 5, 7; Rest., Agency, §§ 15, 16,
26,34,225.)
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[Ul There is ample evidence to support a finding that
Antisdaleand Fong entered into just such a relationship.
Antisdale, as pastor of the church, was in charge of the Vacation Bible School. It was his responsibility to supcrvise and
control the instruction and all activities connected with the
school. He was in charge of the transportation of the children from the church to the playground and of their return
to the church. He had authority to direct the activities of the
children attending the school and to direct them into vehicles
for transportation to the playground. He determined how
.long the children should remain at the playground and when
they should be returned to the church.
For three days, while Antisdale was ill, Fong performed these duties for him. Fong was not a mere volunteer
performing inCidental services for the school; his participation was essential to the conduct of the school since, in Antidalc's absence, he was the only person available to conduct
Bible instruction. Fong's performance of duties for which
Antisdale was responsible did not cease upon the latter's
return to the school. On the day of the accident, although
Antisdale had returned to the school, Fong continued to
conduct the Bible class. Antisdale's own testimony shows
that when Fon~ released the children for transportation
to the playground, Antisdale took charge of the movement.
He directed several of the children to leave Fong's station
wagon and to get into his own automobile. He allowed the
other children, including plaintiif, to remain with Fang,
although he had room for several more children in his own
automobile. He led the way to the playground, with Fong
following closely behind. At all times Antisdale had full
authority over the children in Fong's vehicle as well as in his
own, and he was responsible for their conduct au(l safcty.
If Antisdale had had any doubts about Fong's driving ability
Or responsibility, he could have refused him permission to
drive the children to the playground. Fong's continued connection with the school was possible only because Antisdale
gave his consent, and it could have been severed by Antisdale
at any time.
[13] The evidence that Fong, with Antisdale's knowledge
and consent, performed duties for which the latter was
responsible, that his performance of those duties was subject
to Antisdale's supervision and control, and that his services
could be terminated by Antisdale at any time, supp0l1$ the
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conclusion that Fong was a subagent acting within the !><,ope
of his agency at the time of the accident. This conclusion is
not negatived by the fact that Fong was not paid. (Restatement, Agency, § 225; see, also, Graf v. Harvey, 79 Cal.App.2d
64, 69 [179 P.2d 348] ; Navarro v. Somerfeid. 35 Cal.App.2d
35, 37-38 [94 P.2d 623] ; 1 Cal.Jur., Agency, 790, § 79.)
Edwards Y. Freeman. 34 Ca1.2d 589 [212 P.2d 883], does
not compel a contrary result. In that case, this court held
that it was an error to permit the jury to find that plaintiff
was the principal of her son so as to impute his negligence to
her to bar her recovery for injuries caused by the concurrent
negligence of her son and the defendant. The defendant
attempted to justify the submission of the issue to the jury by
evidence that plaintiff had requested hcr son to drive her to
town to get her glasses fixed and that the accident occurred in
the course of that errand. This court held, however, that
since the undisputed evidence established that plaintiff had
no authority over her son or legal power to control his activities, the route he took, or his operation of his automobile, no
agency relationship existed as a matter of law. There was in
that case no "affirmative evidence adequate to show that ...
either the plaintiff was actually exercising control over the
manner of operation of the car or the relationship of plaintiff
and her son was such as to give plaintiff a legally cognizable
right to control or command the son in his operation of the
machine." (34 Ca1.2d 589, 593.) The decision was based
on the absence of evidence of plaintiff's right to control her
son's operation of the automobile in which she rode, and not.
as Antisdale implies, on the conclusion that, as a matter of
law, no ag'ency relationship can arisp. out of the performance
of services as a gratuitous favor. (Cf. Graf v. Harvey, 79
Cal.App.2d 64, 69 [179 P.2d 348].) It is not applicable to
the present appeal, in which there is ample evidence that
Antisdale had the legal right to control and supervise Fong '8
activities, and to sever his connection with the school at any
time.
The evidence shows that Daily Vacation Bible Schools were
conducted by virtually all churches of the Presbyterian
denomination, including those within the area governed by
the Presbytery of San Francisco, and in fact the Daily Vacation Bible School of the San Mateo church antedated Anti.sdale's arrival there. In many respects the organization of
such schools is similar to that of Sunday Schools and necessarily involves the work of volunteer teachers who assist the
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minister. Antic;dalc testified that the children were divided
into age groups and that he gave the Bible instruction to
those of plaintiff's age and above. There were classes in
handwork and classes in wOTShip and the superviscd recreation pcriods. Extensive volunteer assistance was customarily rendered by the friends and members of the church.
Authority to organize the school and its staff was
inherent in the nature and scope of Antisdale's duties.
[14] Fong was appointed in the exercise of this authority,
and therefore, under the provisions of section 2351 of the
Civil Code, the Presbytery may be held liable for Fong's
negligence. (Civ. Code § 2349; Malmstrom v. Bridges, 8 Cal.
App.2d 5, 8 [47 P.2d 336] ; Rice v. Trinity Oounty, 110 Cal.
247,251 [42 P. 809] ; Seymour v. Oelrichs, 162 Cal. 318, 323
[122 P. 847] ; Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316, 322 [33 P. 913] ;
Daily Telegram v. Ocean View Oil 00., 65 Cal.App. 608,
611-612 [224 P. 1006]; Julian v. Schwartz, 16 Cal.App.2d
310,328 [60 P.2d 887] ; Thompson v. Gibb, 1 Cal.Unrcp. 173,
183-184; 2 Am.Jur [Agcncy] 145, 156-159, §§ 180, 197-199.
See, also, Bank of Oalifornia v. Western Union Telegraph 00.,
1)2 Cal. 280, 289; Gates v. Daley, 54 Cal.App. 654, 655-656
[202 P. 467J; Hollidge v. Duncan, 199 Mass. 121, 123 [85
N.E. 186]; Oampbell v. Trimble, 75 Tex. 270, 271-272 [12
S.W. 863] ; Mechem, The Liabt1ity of a Master for the Negligence of a Stranger Assi.sting His Servant, 3 Mich.L.Rev. 198;
13L.R.A. [N.S.] 572; 45 L.R.A. [N.S.] 382.)
[15] The Presbytery next contends that the corporation
that is a defendant in this suit is not the same as the religious
entity that supervises the Presbyterian ministers and churches
of the San Francisco area. It is elaimed that the defendant
corporation was organized solely to hold property of the local
Presbyterian groups and is not "an operating agency of the
church. " The articles of incorporation of the defendant
show an int(>ntion to incorporate the Presbytery as such-the
preamble states that "the religious association heretofore and
now knoWll as and called the Prcsbytcry of San Francisco
. . . is hereby incorporated. . . ." The purpose clause, moreover, e,inces no such limitcd objective as is now claimed. The
exprcss purposes include: ,. to promote, maintain and sURtain
in whole or in part, religious services in Presbyterian churches
and missions," "to strengthcn and extend the work and
interests of the Gcncral Assembly of the Presbyterian church
in the Unit(>d States of America," and "to carryon any ot]wr
business, and to exercise any other powers which may be
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nec('ssary, proper or convenient to be carried on or exercised
in cqnnectioll with any of the foregoing purposes or incident
thereto." '!'he Pr(>sbytery's supervision of the religious activitie!; of The SIlIJ Mateo Church is included within the broad
scope of thi~ language, which is simply a statement of the
total purposes of the Presbytery before as well as after the
incorporation.
Plal1ltiff's Appeal from the Order Granting a New Trial
[16] After the denial of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Antisdale moved for a new trial on
all statutory grounds. His motion was granted, but the
court's order specified no ground upon which it was made.
Since insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict was
not specified, it must be assumeo that the order granting the
motion was not based on that gronnd. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 657; Adams v. American President Lines, Ltd., 23 Cal.2d
681, 683 [146 P.2d IJ.)
oJ'
In support of the motion for new trial, Antisdale contends
that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that they
might determine as a question of fact whether plaintiff was a
guest or a passenger· in Fong's station wagon, whereas, he
claims. plaintiff was a guest as a matter -of law and a -verdict
against Fong, and Antisdale as Fong's principal, could not
therefore rest on a finding that Fong failed to use ordinary
care for plaintiff's safety. He contends that, since the evidence discloses that Fong performed his services gratuitously
and DO compensation was paid for plaintiff's ride to the playground, the only permissible finding is that plaintiff was a
guest in the station wagon. Plaintiff contends that there is
substantial evidence to support the infe:.'ence that compensation was paid for the ride within the meaning of section 403
and that it was therefore proper to submit the question to the
jury.
[17] It is immaterial that Fong performed the services
gratuitously: he performed those services as the agent of the
Presbytery in discharging Antisdale's duty to transport the;
children to the playground for their recreation period. It is
sufficient therefore if Antisdale, the church, or the Presbytery
. , ' ~ 0 person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a high·
way mthout giving compensation for such ride, nor any other person, has
any rig-ht of action for civil damages against the driver of BUch vehicle
or against any other person legally liable for the Mnduct of such driver
on account of personal injury to or the death of Buch guest during such
ride, unless the plaintiff in any Buch action establishes that Bueh injUl'1
or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or wilful m.i.8conduct
ef eaid driver." (Veh. Code, j 403.)
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received a benefit from the transportation of plaintiff to the
playground.
[18] The transportation of plaintiff to the playground for
the recreation period was not an isolated transaction; it was
an integral part of the conduct of the Bible school as one 01
the normal activities of the San Mateo Presbyterian Church.
It is undisputed that the attendance of the children at the
Bible school was at It'ast of mutual benefit to the children and
the church. The conduct of such schools was authorized by
the church laws, and it was to the interest of the church and
the Presbytery that parents send their children to the school.
Antisdalt' had a large number of handbills printed urging
attendance at the school. The children had recently been
releMed from secular schools for their summer vacation, and
many parents wanted their children to spend the time in the
open air. It is not an unreasonable inft'rence that the daily
open-air recreation periods were designed to induce these
parents to send their children to the school and did induce
them to do so. Such an inference negatives the theory that no
compensation was given for the transportation to such recreation periods. "[B]enefits or considerations other than cash
or its equivalent may be 'compensation.' . . . " (Humphreys
v.San Fran~co Area Council, 22 Cal.2d 436, 442 [139 P.2d
941]; California Cas. Indem. Exchange v. Industrial Ace.
Com., 21 Ca1.2d 461, 464 [132 P.2d 815] ; Darling v. Dreamland Bedding &: Upholstering Co., 44 Cal.App.2d 253, 257
{112 P.2d 338] ; Piercy v. Zeiss, 8 Cal.App.2d 595, 598 [47
P.2d 818] ; Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal.App. 81, 84 [293 P.
841].)
The Bible school was an integral part of the activities of the
church, and the recreation period an integral part of the Bible
school. The conduct of the school was in part financed by
the general funds of the church. In addition, the evidence
discloses that contributions were solicited from the parents of
children attending the school "to defray the expenses incidental to the running of the school." Antisdale testified that
contributions were solicited weekly by giving the children
envelopes to take home for the enclosure of contributions from
their parents. Plaintiff testified that his parents made contri.
butions therefor;
[19] It is clear therefore that plaintiff attended a Bible
school financed in part by parents' contributions to the church
and by their payments to "defray thE' expenses incidental to
the running of the school." Plaintiff's status is analogous to
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that of a student at a public school wh() is given free school
bus service and who is considered :l passcng-cr in the bus by
virtue of his parents' contribution to school expenSl'S by the
payment of taxes. (Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High
School District, 118 Cal.App. 673, 679 [5 P.2d 930] ; sec, also,
Shannon v. Central-Gaither Union School District, 133 Cal.
App. 124,128 [23 P.2d 769].) It may reasonably be inferred
from this evidence that compensation was given for plaintiff's
ride within the meaning of section 403. (Kruzie v. Sanders,
23 Cal.2d 237, 242 [143 P.2d 704] ; Druzanich v. Criley, 19
Ca1.2d 439, 443 [122 P.2d 531; Swink v. Gardena Club, 65
Cal.App.2d 674, 677-678 [151 P.2d 313]; Carey v. City of
Oakland, 44 Cal.App.2d 503, 507-509 [112 P.2d 714] ; Boyson
v. Porter, 10 Cal.App.2d 431, 436 [52 P.2d 582].)
Humphreys v. San Francisco Area Council, 22 Ca1.2d 436
[139 P.2d 941], is not in point. In that case, this court
affirmed a judgment for defendant on the trial court's finding
that plaintiff was in fact a guest. It was sp.!Xlmcally recog-nizcd that a finding that he was a passenger in the vehicle
would also be supported by the evidence, and that the resolution of conflicting evidence was for the trier of fact.
Antisdale next contends that it was improper for the trial
court to instruct the jury that they might find him to be
Fong's principal and therefore liable for Fong's negligence.
We have already discussed the relationships between the
Presbytery and Antisdale and between the Presbytery and
Fong, and we have accepted plaintiff's contention that both
Antisdale and Fong were agents of the Presbytery. Antisdale expressly adopts this contention and relies in addition
on Civil Code section 2351, which provides: "A subagent,
lawfully appointed, represents the principal in like manner
with the original agent; and the original agent is not responsible to third persons for the acts of the subagent."
[20] The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable
to the relationship between a supervisor and his subordinate
employees. The supervisor occupies an economic and legal
position quite different from that of the employer. It is not
the supervisor's work that is being performed, nor does he
share in the profits which the employees' conduct is designed
to produce. In the usual situation, furthermore, he, like his
subordinates, is a wage earner, and he is seldom able to
respond in damages to an appreciably greater extent than
they. For these reasons, the law has shifted financial rf'spon·
sibility frOlD the supl:rvisor, who exercises immediate control,
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to the employer, who exercises ultimate control and for whose
benefit the work is done. (Bank of Oalifornia v. Western
Un'ion Telegraph 00., 52 Cal. 280, 288-292.) Section 2351 of
the Civil Code codifies this principle and has been uniformly
interpreted to exempt superior employees from vicarious
liability to third persons for the tortious conduct of subordinates. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535, 539 [269 P. 425,
61 A.L.R. 297] ; Handley v. Lombardi, 122 Cal.App. 22, 29
[9 P.2d 867] ; Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal. App. 372, 384
[291 P. 591] ; Los Angeles v. l,os Angeles Pacific Navigation
00., 84 Cal.App. 413, 419 [258 P. 409]. See, also, Restatement, Agency, section 358 (1) ; Ellis v. Southern Rat'lway 00.,
72 S.C. 465, 473 [52 S.E. 228, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 378] ; 61 A.L.R.
290.) [21] It was therefore error to instruct the jury that
they might find Antisdale liable for Fong's negligence.
[22] Since there was a substantial conflict in the evidence
as to whether Antisdale himself was negligent, it cannot be
determined whether the jury based its verdict against Antisdale on that ground or on the erroneous agency instructions
that he could be found liable for Fong's negligence. Under
these circumstances it was proper for the trial court to grant
the motIon for new trial. (Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Oorp.,
2:) Oal.2d 165, 169, 170-171 [153 P.2d 338] ; Bieser v. Dom'es,
119 Cal.App. 659, 663 [7 P.2d 388] ; Middleton v. Oaliforma
j~treet Oable Railway 00., 73 Cal.,App.2d 641, 646-647 [167
P.2d 239] ; see, also, Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 140
1148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221].) This determination does
not affect the Presbytery, for it is clearly liable for Fon~'s
negligence whether or not the jury based its verdict against
Antisdale on the ground that Antisdale was negligent.
The judgment in favor of the Presbytery of San Francisco
is reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter a judgment
against the Presbytery in accord:mce with the verdict of the
jury. The order granting a new trial as to Antisdale is
affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment. In so doing I
think it proper to note, however, that in my view1 Fong was 8
1:Por the rC.'l..~ons and upon the grounds more fully discussed in thE
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice 600dcll fOT tht> District l;Ourt of App<>ul.
First Appellate District, Di\'ision Two, wllil'h discussion appears at pages
ti2·53 of tho opinion as reported in 220 P.2d 48.
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mere volunteer over whose conduct neither Antisdale nor the
Presbytery had any authority or right to exercise control and
whose negligence cannot be related to tbem on the theory of
respondeat superior. It would follow that the judgment to be
entered against the Presbytery as directed by the majority
should not stand as against a motion for new trial or an
appeal (see Lauritsen v. Goldsmith (1929), 99 Cal.App 671,
676 [279 P. 168] ; Ferran v. Mulcrevy (1935), 9 Cal.App.2d
129, 131-133 [48 P.2d 948] ; Sutherland v. Palme (1949), 93
Cal.App.2d 307, 314-315 [208 P.2d 1035] ; Fortier Trans. Co.
v. Union Packing Co. (1950), 96 Cal.App.2d 748, 756-757
[216 P.2d 470]), for the same reasons which the majority bold
require a new trial as to Antisdale. i.e., liability of the Presbytery turns upon liability of Antisdale, and if a new trial is
proper as to the latter it is likewise required as to the
Presbytery.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 28,
1951. Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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